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“Kibaki Tena?” The Challenges of a
Campaign
Anne Cussac
1 The 2007 electoral  campaign,  which took place in a  confused partisan situation,  was
characterised by serious debate and true mobilisation which often took a violent turn.
The campaign was very lively, pitting two men of diametrically opposed nature and vision
against each other. At the same time, it raised a number of challenges that could have
contributed  to  an  exacerbation  of  violence  after  the  announcement  of  the  disputed
presidential results.
2 At the end of the campaign, the voting process on 27 December 2007 was peaceful as
compared to the post-election period.  Before the elections,  the competition was stiff
between the two main political groupings—Mwai Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU)
and Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). Additionally, the 2007 election
was a test for Kibaki, who despite considerable socioeconomic success—economic growth
(6% in 2006), and free primary education—found his position weakened by the haphazard
management of his cabinet and his failure to keep several of his campaign promises. The
numerous  cabinet  reshuffles  and  the  entry  of  opposition  members  into  government
considerably stirred up controversy.1 Mainly, however, whereas Kibaki was elected on the
grounds of his promise to fight corruption, several of his ministers were interrogated on
these matters.2 Finally, although the promise of a new constitution was one of Kibaki’s
main campaign arguments, the government was further weakened by the rejection of its
proposal during the referendum on 21 November 2005.3 Additionally, the voting process
not only pitted two men against each other, but also two visions for the future of the
country. M. Kibaki promised the continuation of his policies under the slogan Kibaki Tena4
while R. Odinga claimed that he would lead the country to a “third liberation,” to heal it
of  corruption  and  tribalism.  The context  in  which  the  campaign  was  held  will  be
investigated in this paper in order to better understand why electoral fraud provoked
such a violent reaction.
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The complexity of political party stakes
3 The  three  main  groups  in  competition  in  2007  emerged  after  the  2005  referendum,
bearing witness to the rather opportunistic  nature of  partisan grouping.  While these
appeared as personal and ethno-regional enterprises, they coalesced in the search for
access to national power and charged themselves not only ethnically but also politically
according to the regions. In a parallel process, the only group with a national anchorage,
Kenya  African  National  Union  (Kanu)—former  single  party—seemed  weakened
throughout the campaign period.
 
Party confusion
4 For the 2002 elections, Mwai Kibaki drew from an anti-Kanu front, the National Rainbow
Coalition (NARC), which united the National Alliance of Kenya (NAK), which in itself was a
coalition of 14 parties comprising the Democratic Party (DP), at that time headed by Mwai
Kibaki, and Raila Odinga’s Rainbow Alliance (then Liberal Democratic Party, LDP). Very
soon after its victory in 2002, NARC split up. Frustrated by Kibaki’s lack of respect for past
agreements,5 the majority of LDP members of parliament close to Odinga joined Kanu,
and became the main opposition party. This was the birth of the “Orange Movement,”
created to fight against the new constitution proposed by Kibaki. The rejection of the
Constitution  project  by  citizens  during  the  November 2005  referendum  eventually
wrecked NARC with Kibaki having dismissed the ministers who called for a rejection of
the document. The President no longer relied on a limited coalition and he lost a large
part of his popular support.6 NARC was also affected by the departure of several of its MPs
to other groups created much later,  such as NARC-K and ODM. In total,  about three-
quarters out of 222 MPs in the Ninth Parliament changed their political party between
2002 and the end of 2006.7 Moreover, until Kibaki announced in October 2007 that he
would be standing under the ticket of a new coalition, the Party of National Unity (PNU),
three parties (DP, NARC, and a scission of NARC, NARC-Kenya) disagreed about him being
their leader. Beyond these institutional aspects,8 this strong mobility led to a questioning
of  the  significance  and  function  of  political  formations  in  a  country  which,  since
independence, has lived under a de facto and de jure single party between 1982 and 1992.
5 African political parties have for a long time been a rather neglected object of study. The
opening up to multipartyism in the 1990s,  which gave rise to a multitude of fleeting
groupings,  barely  improved  the  situation.9 Kenya  was  no  exception  and  in
November 2007,  when  the  ECK  made  the  final  list  of  electoral  candidates  public,
134 political parties had been registered.10 Nevertheless, just a few of them dominated the
political scene and these changed names according to their whims for the elections but
were  nevertheless  composed of  the  same members,  who often had been engaged in
politics  for  a  long time.  Added to  this,  the  partisan formations  did  not  translate  to
ideological differences and were mainly electoral machines of individuals who used them
to their own interests.11
6 Moreover,  because  ethno-regional  origins  and  patronage  are  central  aspects  in  the
political life of Kenyans, political parties are very often anchored in the region of their
main leader and only rarely do they have a truly national nature apart from creating
coalitions of politicians of different ethnicities, which probably explains their fragility.12
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For  example,  the  Democratic  Party  (DP),  created  in  December 1991  by  M.  Kibaki,
dominates the Central Province, a Kikuyu-populated area. Ford-Kenya is associated with
Western  Kenya  and  Musikari  Kombo.  In  the  same  vein,  the  Orange  Democratic
Movement-Kenya (ODM-K), of the presidential candidate Kalonzo Musyoka who belongs
to the Kamba ethnic group, enjoyed an audience limited to Ukambani.
7 Taking into account  the large ethnic  dispersion in the country,13 in  order  to  endear
themselves to the electorate, politicians have no choice but to mobilise voters outside of
their ethnic block. Presidential aspirants were therefore heavily involved in mobilising
their allies across the country quite early on, in an attempt to play the multi-ethnic card.
For example, M. Kibaki relied on Daniel Moi and Kipruto Kirwa (both Kalenjin) in the Rift
Valley, on Chirau Ali Makwere (Mijikenda) in the Coast, on Musikari Kombo (Luhya) in
the West,  and on Simeon Nyachae (Gusii)  in the Kisii  region.  R. Odinga,  on his  part,
benefited from Musalia Mudavadi’s (Luhya) popularity in the West,  from Najib Balala
(Arab) at the Coast, from Joseph Nyaga (Mbeere) in central Eastern, and from Fred Gumo
(Luhya) and Reuben Ndolo (Luo) in Nairobi.
8 Despite all this, the institutional weakness of the political parties manifested itself during
the primaries for the designation of candidates to parliamentary and local seats.14 These
nominations unfolded in a chaotic and often violent manner, and several candidates who
lost in the large parties kept their candidacy by joining less well-known political parties.15
 
Kanu’s unlikely recovery
9 Kanu, the oldest party in the country, dictatorial under Kenyatta and Moi, never emerged
from its 2002 retreat.16 Officially having been at the head of the opposition, the political
party saw about half of its leadership rally behind ODM, with the exception of Uhuru, the
son of Jomo Kenyatta. In 2007, its weakened state was confirmed as, for the first time in
its history, the party had no candidate in the presidential elections and was represented
in a few constituencies for parliamentary elections.17 Kanu’s fragility was distinct in the
parliamentary elections of 1997, where it won only four seats.18 In the run-up to the 2002
polls,  while  Moi  unilaterally  chose  Uhuru Kenyatta  as  his  successor,  he  encountered
criticisms and defections.  The prevailing difficulties  in Kanu certainly owed much to
Kenyatta,  an  inexperienced  and  highly  criticised  politician  within  the  party.  In
January 2005, after his elevation to party chairman, Nicholas Biwott, a historic figure in
Kanu, created a dissident group for some time before returning to the main party.
10 And so it was that Uhuru Kenyatta found himself at the head of a divided Kanu, deserted
by several of his former members. A faction coalesced around Njenga Karume and thus
identified with the Kibaki government, with other MPs from Kiambu. On the other hand,
the majority of Kanu MPs from the Rift Valley associated themselves with ODM at the end
of 2005, and were led by W. Ruto. The latter wanted to enter into a coalition in 2007 while
Moi believed that Kanu could manage on their own in the parliamentary elections. The
battle between the two men was not only about the leadership of the formation but also
about the leadership of the Rift Valley Kalenjin community. Rift Valley is the region with
the highest number of voters, amounting to about 3.5 million. Throughout his presidency,
Moi largely controlled the Kalenjin vote, and in 2007, he attempted to win over his voters
to support Kibaki.19 In 2002, many Kalenjin followed him by voting for Kenyatta, then in
2005, against the constitutional reforms project. However, Moi’s popularity crumbled and
is today limited to the political and economic elite from the Rift Valley, as well as those of
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his Tugen community. For his part, Ruto had the support of the youth and the poor, as
well  as the Kipsigis  and Nandi sub-groups.  On the other hand,  Kibaki  had very little
popularity  among the Kalenjin who had not  forgiven him for  sacking many of  their
community members from the positions of authority that they had acquired under Moi’s
rule. The alliance between Moi and Kibaki in 2007 was ultimately ambiguous, as Kenyatta,
Kibaki’s adversary in 2002, campaigned for him in 2007!
 
Pre-electoral violence changes
11 Pre-electoral  violence,  a  recurring  occurrence  after  the  beginning  of  multipartyism,
became a tool used by the government to stamp its dominance in the Kenyan society.20
Termed ethnic confrontations, land battles, livestock theft, border clashes or banditry,
these acts, occurring in a local framework of deep conflict, also had a hidden agenda of
terrorising the populations suspected of supporting the opposition, in order to prevent
them from voting. Despite this, the 2002 elections demonstrated the failure of the State-
sponsored violence,21 as it could not prevent NARC’s victory over Kanu. Several people
who  had  been  responsible  for  the  violence  in  1992  and  1997  had  since  joined  the
opposition, thus weakening Kanu’s capacity to mobilise militia.22 Additionally, in 2002 the
two main candidates were Kikuyu. Choosing on ethnic grounds was therefore impossible
both for the Kikuyu as for the other Kenyans.23
12 In 2007, the situation was quite different as the most serious presidential candidates were
from different ethnic communities,  considered as politically antagonistic.  There were
therefore  fears  that  the  identity  themes  would  be  manipulated  for  political  ends.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to affirm that the pre-electoral violence was a preview of the
events after the announcement of the results, even if the reaction of the losers could have
been  worrying,  due  to  the  stiffness  of  the  competition.  In  reality,  the  pre-electoral
confrontations resulted in a resurfacing of previous problems. This paper will discuss the
cases of Molo, a rural area, and of the Mungiki movement in the urban settings.
13 Molo district  was  the epicentre of  violence in 1992.  During the 2007 campaigns,  the
violence mainly affected Kuresoi district, where hundreds of houses were burnt down and
several  dozens  of  people  killed  between  October  and  December.24 The  region  had
experienced an old land problem, linked to the establishment of “squatters” from the
Central province, in the colonial era.25 In a situation where thousands of Kalenjin were
chased away from Mau Forest in Molo District by the Kibaki government where they had
illegally settled, the Kalenjin believed that the land in the area was theirs by right. Kenya
is an agrarian society where access to land is a fundamental issue. It is used by some
members of the elite for political ends, by resorting to fear tactics. For example, among
the Kikuyu, fear rested on the idea that if they lost the presidency, they would also lose
their land. In Molo, the Kikuyu are considered by the Kalenjin as illegitimate holders of
the land and in this context, the land battle easily transformed into a macro-political
conflict. Kalenjin leaders also played on this resentment inciting the rural poor within
their  community  to  expel  their  Kikuyu  neighbours,  promising  to  give  them  the
abandoned lands. Described as a response to livestock theft, the violence in fact aimed at
removing not only the Kikuyu but also the Kisii, considered as favouring President Kibaki
—a Kikuyu—and PNU, to prevent them from taking part in the election. The authorities
were then blamed for their passivity in view of the serious problems experienced in both
Molo and Mount Elgon, whereas they concentrated on the fight against Mungiki in the
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capital  city.  In these regions,  far-flung from the main centres of power,  the violence
mainly concerned local actors and did not threaten the government organs, as opposed to
the troubles that affected the capital and which were violently repressed.
14 In March 2002,  after  the confrontations that  opposed two militia  groups (the Kikuyu
Mungiki movement and the Luo Taliban) in Nairobi, all vigilant groups were banned by
the  Kibaki  administration.26 Despite  this  ban,  Mungiki  members  supported  Uhuru
Kenyatta’s  candidacy  in  December 2002.  After  his  failure,  the  sect  members—mainly
comprising unemployed youth—felt abandoned by the Kikuyu elite. Reconverted into a
militia controlling residential areas that had been neglected by the government, the sect
specialised  in  clandestine  economic  activities  and  settling  of  scores,27 progressively
evading control by politicians. As the group was well established in Nairobi and it had
spread  into  the  society  and  the  State,  Mungiki  was  a  challenge  for  the  authorities.
Therefore,  from  June 2006,  the  Kibaki  regime  launched  an  attack  against  the  sect,
resulting in confrontations between the Mungiki members and the police in the Mathare
slums and in some rural areas of Central Province. Additionally, after the arrest of its
former leader, Maina Njenga, in February 2007, followed by his five-year jail term in May,
the  group  increased  its  extremely violent  activities,  which  the  police  responded  to
brutally.28 However in 2005, Maina Njenga had supported M. Kibaki in calling for a “Yes”
vote  in  the  constitutional  referendum and  in  2007,  Mungiki  had  again  mobilised  in
support of Kibaki under the umbrella of the Kenya Youth Alliance. Nevertheless, because
of its increasingly violent acts,  Mungiki became unpopular among the Kikuyu middle
class and divides the politicians of this community. The group is still said to have the
support  of  influential  politicians  and  some  Kikuyu  Ministers  such  as  John  Michuki
(Internal Security), Maina Kamanda (Sports) and Njenga Karume (Defense) are suspected
to have links with the sect. But for the Kikuyu elite, which needed to control its bases, it
was also a matter of maintaining their control on the sect, even if it implied a “sacrifice”
of some of its members. In this battle, largely illegally carried out, hundreds of supposed
Mungiki adherents were killed mercilessly.
15 According to the Kenya National Commission of Human Rights (KNCHR), more than 500
young men, mainly Kikuyu, were killed by the police between June and October 2007.
Their bodies were placed in several mortuaries across the country or abandoned in the
fields.29 The repression against the sect was on the headlines throughout this period even
if, apart from these violent acts, real debates also marked the campaign.
 
A campaign of explosive debate
16 The campaign was structured by several highly sensitive themes and the promises made
elicited huge expectations, particularly among the underprivileged groups in the country,
the poor and the youth. While the majimbo30 issue solidified the competition between the
two main parties, it also pit two men, of opposing views and personalities, against each
other.
 
Revisiting the majimbo controversy
17 Promising “growth and poverty reduction,” the presidential candidates disagreed on the
issue  of  regionalism,  better  known  as  majimbo.  This  issue  was  at  the  core  of  the
constitutional debate in the 1960s and at independence, Kenya adopted a federal system
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whereby  each  province  had  its  own government.  This  experiment  failed  due  to  the
incapability of some regions to govern themselves and the fierce opposition by Jomo
Kenyatta, who became the Prime Minister in 1963.31 Thus, under the Kanu government,
regionalism was abandoned for centralisation. In the 1990s, the term re-emerged with
one specific meaning, linked with ethnic violence in the Rift Valley,  Nyanza, and the
Coastal region. As the Kenyatta regime favoured the Kikuyu and associated groups—Embu
and Meru—a large proportion of the country’s wealth belonged to this new elite, grouped
within the Gikuyu Embu Meru Association (Gema). Hence, under Moi’s rule and “to protect
the integrity of the small tribes that were at the risk of being choked by the larger ones, such as the
Kikuyu”32 some  Kanu  strong  men,  for  example  N.  Biwott,  William ole  Ntimama,  and
Kipkalya Kones referred to majimbo and formed a coalition named Kamatusa (KAlenjin,
MAasai, TUrkana, SAmburu) aimed at uniting these different communities. In an attempt
to strengthen their  power in a  situation of  growing demand for multipartyism,  they
defended the concept  to  promote a  federal  system based on ethnicity,  involving the
expulsion of  “non-indigenous” groups,  particularly  the Kikuyu,  but  also the Luo and
Luhya, to their land of origin.33
18 While the idea of majimbo was called upon by ODM during the campaign as a form of
regionalised government that would benefit the poorest provinces, its reactivation was
not  without  danger  due  to  the  multi-faceted meanings  of  the  word,  which also  had
negative connotations. Thus, even if they denied it, some in the ODM shared the ethnic
vision of majimbo. Among them was William Ole Ntimama who, during the 1997 polls,
presented himself  as  the strongest  defendant of  the rights of  the Maasaï  community
against  the Kikuyu in his  Narok district.  On the PNU side,  it  is  due to its  (majimbo)
potential  for  conflict  that  the  party  opposed  the  idea,  but  also  because  the  Kikuyu
community was the first victim of its ethnic use. Regionalism as a concept reappeared
during the constitutional discussions from the end of the 1990s, as a response to the
centralised government model. The idea of “devolution” thus became one of the most
discussed themes, with the feeling that it allowed the promotion of minority interests and
marginalised groups, and a more equitable sharing of resources in a society rife with
inequalities. After the failure of the constitutional reform, some candidates, starting with
Raila  Odinga,  once  more  took  up  the  idea  of  decentralisation  and  suggested  the
introduction of majimbo to guarantee a more equal sharing of power between the centre
and the periphery, and a better distribution of resources. From a political point of view,
the idea was good as the theme and its ethnic undertones were very popular in some
areas, such as the Coast, which had a substantial voter base of about 1.1 million. In the
Central Province, with a majority Kikuyu population and already in the bag for Kibaki, the
idea was unpopular, as it was a reminder of the violent acts aimed at the Kikuyu in 1992
and 1997. Odinga therefore had to unite all regions of the country, in his favour, against
the Kikuyu.34
19 This resurgence of the issue revealed a deep tension between the region and the nation
and brought to light greater challenges, reflecting the limits of the government model
that  Kenya  had  maintained  since  independence.  This  was  characterised  by  an  all-
powerful  presidency  and  the  absence  of  real  power-sharing  in  a  context  where  an
exclusive ethno-regional conception of power leads many “wananchi” to think that it is
only  the  ethnic  group  of  the  President  that  benefits  from the  fruits  of  power.  The
majimbo idea was a reminder of the problems of unequal allocation of resources between
the various regions, efficiency, political transparency in development as well as citizen
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participation. The promotion of the principle by Odinga was also part of his speeches on
the need for change, in opposition to the continuity promised by Kibaki.
 
Two men, two images
20 The competition between the two favourites, Odinga and Kibaki, symbolised the political
battle between the Luo and Kikuyu, which has fired up political imagination in Kenya
since independence. The potential victory of Raila Odinga would have been a return to
history,35 and his accession to the presidency would have represented a victory against
the  Kikuyu,  accused  of  having  hoarded  power.36 Besides,  having  renounced  his
candidature to support M. Kibaki in 2002, the Luo leader held onto 2007 as his best chance
of  accessing  the  presidency.  He  sought  to  give  himself  a  national  image,  describing
himself as “The People’s Candidate” against the Kenyatta and Moi37 dynasties. He promised
a “third liberation” after independence and the 2002 political  transition,  to cure the
country of corruption and tribalism. Thanks to his campaign themes, R. Odinga was very
popular  among  the  youth  of  all  ethnic  groups,  who  were  strongly  affected  by
unemployment in a system tainted by inequalities. In comparison, Kibaki appeared as the
candidate for the business class,38 basing on his economic record to promise that “the
work would continue.”39
21 More  than  the  ethnic  factor,  the  opposition  between  the  two  forms  of  power  that
structured the campaign explains why the failure of “The People’s Candidate” resulted in
such an outpouring of violence in poor areas of the towns, where the youth and the poor,
having barely benefited from economic growth and the effects of government policies,
had placed high hopes on the possibility of a change in power.
22 Despite disequilibrium in the candidates’ resources (for example in access to public media
and in the use of State machinery), throughout his campaign, Odinga demonstrated his
skill in using images and shock tactics, also confirming his capacity to mobilise crowds
and sustain popular enthusiasm. He had proved this particular skill in 2002 during the
NARC campaign  and  contributed  to  Kibaki’s  victory.  Faced  with  an  apparatchik  like
Kibaki,  Odinga played on his past as a prisoner and opponent of the Moi regime. He
appeared as a master propagandist, playing the conspiracy card and posing as a victim.
During the  campaign,  for  example,  he  affirmed that  the  difficulties  surrounding the
registration of ODM were part of the Executive’s strategy to weaken the opposition or
that the failure to renew the mandate of the Vice-President of the Electoral Commission
was intended to rig the elections. Besides, the composition of this Commission raised
controversy throughout the campaign, as all members of this body that had controlled
the 2007 elections had been appointed or had had contracts renewed by Mwai Kibaki.40
Nevertheless, the latter tried more than to show that he had the strength for a second
term41 to prove the independence of  the Commission.  On the opposite,  his two main
challengers, R. Odinga and K. Musyoka had the advantage to been seen as “young” and
dynamic, K. Musyoka, the outsider, capitalised on his “Mr. Clean” image by making his
personal wealth public, as a sign of his dedication to financial transparency and the battle
against corruption.42 Basing on the strong religious nature of the Kenyan society, he also
used his reputation for piety and of being a born-again Christian, using terms such as
“miracle”  and  “prophecy”  during  the  launching  of  his  campaign  at  Uhuru  Park  in
October 2007. He believed that he would surprise everyone by snatching the presidency
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from the two favourites.43 The politicians thus played off on values (faith, health, honesty)
and not only on political networks or on ethnicity.
23 Religion was actually a recurrent theme throughout the electoral campaign, especially
after the rendering public of the agreement between R. Odinga and a group of Muslim
leaders, in which he committed to regularly respond to the critiques of the group,44 in
exchange for the support of the religious leaders. Despite having to endure the criticism
of  some  Christian  leaders,  this  agreement  allowed  Odinga  to  ally  himself  with  the
influential  Muslim  minority,  towards  whom  Kibaki  also  increased  efforts.45 It  is
nevertheless quite surprising that the Muslim representatives took up as much media
space as they eventually did. This is because Christian churches have always appeared as
the most influential religious structure in the public arena, playing a fundamental role in
the political debate in both 1992 and 1997.46 During the campaign in 2007, just as in 2002,
most Christian leaders took a neutral stance, simply reminding citizens of the importance
of voting and of holding free, fair and peaceful elections.
24 Whereas the outburst of violence that affected Kenya after the announcement of the
controversial results of the presidential elections may have surprised most observers, it is
nevertheless irrefutable that all through the campaign period, there was evident tension,
given the stakes and the explosive nature of some topics such as majimbo or the unequal
access  to  resources.  By  promising  a  sharing  of  power  and  national  wealth  and  by
posturing as the candidate for the underprivileged masses, Raila Odinga created huge
hopes among the youth and the poorest of society. The violence that broke out from
27 December 2007 were mostly an expression of the disappointments of those who had
voted for change in 2002 and had not experienced any improvement in their situation.
Having expressed their desire for “a better life”47 through voting, after the failure of their
candidate, a section of the population resorted to violence not only to express their anger
but also to appropriate the wealth that they had hoped to have access to.48
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NOTES
1. Both in 2004 and 2005, members of Ford-People and Kanu joined the government,
despite being in the Opposition.
2. David Mwiraria, Kiraitu Murungi and Chris Murungari,  as well as Kibaki’s personal
assistant Alfred Getonga and the vice-president Moody Awori were cited in the Anglo-
Leasing financial  scandal.  George Saitoti,  the architect of  free primary education was
interrogated in the Goldenberg affair.
3. The document was rejected by 57% votes. For more on its origins and and the revision
process, see W. Mutunga,  Constitution-Making from the Middle.  Civil  Society and Transition
Politics in Kenya, 1992–1997, Sareat, 1999; the chapter in H. Charton and C. Medard (dir.),
Annuaire de l’Afrique orientale 2005, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2007, p. 59–128.
4. Kibaki Tena, meaning “Kibaki once more,” was the campaign slogan of the incumbent
president.
5. Contrary to what was expected,  the positions were unequally distributed;  the first
government appointed by M. Kibaki had 17 NAK ministers and only 8 from LDP. 
6. L.  Maina,  F.  Waswa  and  S.  Waiyego,  ‘Pitfalls  in  constituion-making  in  Kenya:
experiences from Bomas and the 2005 national referendum.’ In H. Charton and C. Médard
(dir.), Annuaire de l’Afrique orientale 2005, op. cit., p. 123.
7. ‘New bull to tame political parties.’ Sunday Nation, 3 December 2006, p. 7. Odinga had
changed his political affiliation seven times, while Kibaki had done so five times. See
‘Masters of defection: Raila and Kibaki lead.’ The Standard, 13 September 2006, p. 1–2.
8. There is no specific law on the formation, management and funding of political parties.
The proposed law on this issue in 2007 was not signed by Kibaki before the dissolution of
Parliament.
9. Political parties in Africa today seem to attract more interest. See G. Erdmann, ‘Party
research: Western European bias and the “African labyrinth.”’ Democratization, vol. 11, no
3, 2004, p. 63–87; M. Gazibo, ‘Pour une réhabilitation de l’analyse des partis en Afrique.’
Politique Africaine, no 104, December 2006, p. 8; G. Erdmann and M. Basedau, Problems of
categorizing and explaining party systems in Africa,  Giga Working Papers, no 40, 2007; M.
Basedau, G. Erdmann and A. Mehler, Votes, Money and Violence. Political parties and elections
in sub-Saharan Africa, Uppsala, Nordiska Afrika Institutet, Scottsville, KwaZulu-Natal Press.
10. www.eck.or.ke/downloads/politicalparties.pdf [not  available.  Last  archive].  More
than 300 political formations were recognised by the Attorney General, but only half of
them were registered with the ECK.
11. P. Wanyande, ‘The politics of alliance building in Kenya: the search for opposition
unity.’ In W.O. Oyugi, P. Wanyande and C.O. Mbai (eds.), The Politics of Transition in Kenya.
From Kanu to Narc, Nairobi, Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2003, p. 148. The Kenya Democratic
Alliance (Kenda) is significant in this case. This grouping, created by Kamlesh Pattni, a
businessman implicated in the Goldenburg scandal, allowed him to change his image.
12. However, Kanu was an exception and enjoyed a national reach.
13. Kenya has  42  ethnic  groups  which are  basically  concentrated in certain regions:
Kikuyu in Central Province, Luo in Nyanza Province and Luhya in Western Province.
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14. PNU,  ODM and ODM-K had chosen to hold the primaries  for  the choice of  their
candidates  in  the  local  and  parliamentary  elections.  These  unfolded  in  a  rather
disorganised manner because in theory,  only party members were eligible to vote,  it
turned out that an identity card and voter’s card were sufficient for one to participate.
This resulted in a situation where, for example, a PNU member could take part in ODM
primaries and vice versa.
15. Kenda is  also of  interest in this instance,  because as it  did not have presidential
candidates,  it  registered  a  considerable  number  of  parliamentary  aspirants,  having
benefited from an increase of several hopefuls left out during the primaries of the main
political parties.
16. D. Anderson, ‘Le declin et la chute de la Kanu. La recomposition des partis politiques
dans la succession de Moi (Kenya).’ Politique Africaine, no 90, June 2003, p. 37–55.
17. Kanu rallied around PNU to support Kibaki’s candidacy to the presidency, but kept its
own candidates for the local and parliamentary elections.
18. K. Kanyinga, ‘Limitations of political liberalisation: parties and electoral politics in
Kenya, 1992–2002.’ In W.O. Oyugi, P. Wanyande, C.O. Mbai (eds.), The Politics of Transition… 
op. cit., p. 96–127.
19. Moi supported Kibaki as Kanu did not have a presidential candidate. But he intended
his party to present its own candidates in the parliamentaries and not under the banner
of PNU.
20. M.  Kagwanja,  Killing the  Vote.  State-sponsored Violence  and Flawed Elections  in  Kenya,
Nairobi, Kenya Human Rights Commission, 1998.
21. P.  Mutahi,  ‘Political  violence  in  the  elections.’  In  H.  Maupeu,  M.  Katumanga,  W.
Mitullah (eds.), The Moi Succession. Elections 2002, Nairobi, Transafrica Press, 2005, p. 69–95.
22. S.  Brown,  ‘Theorising  Kenya’s  protracted  transition  to  democracy.’  Journal  of
Contemporary African Studies, vol. 22, no 3, 2004, p. 332–3.
23. P. O. Asingo,  ‘The  political  economy  of  transition  in  Kenya.’  In  W.O.  Oyugi,  P.
Wanyande, C.O. Mbai (eds.), The Politics of Transition…, op. cit., p. 39.
24. ‘Why decades-old conflict is unlikely to end soon.’ Daily Nation, 5 December 2007, p. 32.
25. Under colonisation, the Kikuyu, chased away from the Central Province by the British
colonialists,  settled in the Rift Valley and at independence, taking advantage of their
political and economic dominance, settled in large numbers in the region.
26. Several  private militia  were created in the 1990s in order to provide security in
certain areas where the government had absconded its role. These gangs made the slum-
dwellers  pay for  their  security,  for  water  and electricity.  Mungiki  stands out  in this
matter.  Created as a socio-religious group to revive Kikuyu traditions,  the movement
progressively transformed into a violent militia. Mungiki is concentrated in several slums
of Nairobi and in some parts of the Central and Rift Valley provinces. It controls the
matatu industry in areas of low populations. See D. Anderson, ‘Vigilants, violence and the
politics of public order in Kenya.’ African Affairs,  vol. 101, no 405, 2002, p. 531–555; H.
Maupeu,  ‘Mungiki  et  les  élections.  Les  mutations politiques d’un prophétisme kikuyu
(Kenya).’ Politique Africaine, no 87, October 2002, p. 117–137 ; P. Kagwanja, ‘Facing Mount
Kenya  or  facing  Mecca  ?  The  Mungiki,  ethnic  violence  and  the  politics  of  the  Moi
succession in Kenya, 1987–2002.’ African Affairs, vol. 102, no 406, 2003, p. 25–49.
“Kibaki Tena?” The Challenges of a Campaign
Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est / The East African Review, 38 | 2008
11
27. Mungiki is a sect that follows several codes and rituals. After having taken the oath, if
a member of the group leaves, he is considered as a traitor. Several members of the sect
who tried to leave it were assasinated.
28. Maina Njenga had intended to present Mungiki candidates in the elections. This was a
threat to M. Kibaki who needed to control his Kikuyu base.
29. See www.knchr.org/dmdocuments/Execution_Disappearance.pdf [not available. See
archive].
30. Jimbo (majimbo pl.) is a Kiswahili word meaning region.
31. In 1964, Kenyatta amended the Constitution to set up a highly cenytralised republic,
of which he becane president. See D.M. Anderson, ‘Yours in the struggle for Majimbo.’
Nationalism and the  party  politics  of  decolonization  in Kenya,  1995–1964.’  Journal  of
Contemporary History, vol. 40, no 3, 2005, p. 547–564.
32. A. Morton, Moi: The making of an African Statesman. London, M. O’Mara Books, 1998, p.
108.
33. Asserting that the Rift Valley was Maasai and Kalenjin territory, they encouraged
their supporters to expel members of other ethnic groups, suspected of voting for the
opposition. The violence cost 1500 people their lives and displaced at least 300,000 others.
See  C.  Medard,  ‘Dispositifs  électoraux  et  violence  ethniques:  réflexions  sur  quelques
stratégies territoriales du régime kényan.’ Politique Africaine, no 70, September 1998, p. 32–
39 ; J.M. Klopp, ‘Can moral ethnicity trump political tribalism ? The struggle for land and
nation in Kenya.’ African Studies, vol. 61, no 2, 2002, p. 269–294.
34. Daily Nation, 30 October 2007.
35. Having refused the offer from the British to lead Kenya while Jomo Kenyatta was not
free, Oginga Odinga let him take over the leadership of the country.
36. E.S.A. Odhiambo, ‘Hegemonic enterprises and instrumentalities of survival: ethnicity
and  democracy  in  Kenya.’  In  B.  Berman,  D.  Eyoh,  W.  Kymlicka  (eds.),  Ethnicity  and
Democracy in Africa, Oxford, James Currey, 2004, p. 167–182; A. Oloo, ‘The Raila factor in
Luoland.’ In H. Maupeu, M. Katumanga, W. Mitullah (eds.), The Moi Succession. op. cit., p.
159–196. The Luo were believed to have been margianlised under Kenyatta and Moi and
the proof is in the marginalisation or assassination of principal Luo political figures such
as Oginga Odinga, Tom Mboya and Roibert Ouko.
37. For Odinga, the Kibaki-Moi-Kenyatta alliance aimed to guarantee this supremacy and
Kenyatta  agreed  to  support  Kibaki  in  2007  in  exchange  for  his  support  in  the  2012
elections.
38. An economist trained at Makerere University, then at London School of Economics,
Kibaki is a political veteran--elected since 1963, he was Vice-President in the Moi regime,
after which he became an opposition figure in the 1990s and founded the Democratic
Party.
39. Kazi iendelee—may the work continue—was a PNU slogan.
40. According to an agreement completed in 1997, the opposition should have proposed
names for half  the members of  the commission.  However,  this  agreement was never
subjected to law and therefore, the President had no obligation to honour it.
41. On a visit in Mombasa, Kibaki walked the streets to prove that he had the energy and
vitality to take on second term. Sunday Nation, 14 October 2007.
42. Daily Nation, 13 December 2007.
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43. ‘ODM-K launches campaign.’ Daily Nation, 15 October 2007.
44. These demands were mainly on the delay in the obtaining identification papers,
harassment of some Muslims who they claimed were victimised by the authorities within
the  framework  of  the  fight  against  terrorism  or  their  marginalisation  in  terms  of
education and employment.
45. In  October,  Kibaki  formed a  team to  consider  the  issues  raised  by  the  Muslims
(discrimination, harrassment) and he also announced the setting up of of an office for
issuing of passports to Muslims, in order to facilitate their pilgrimages to Mecca.
46. For more on the relationships between the Churches and politics, refer to H. Maupeu,
‘The churches and the polls.’ In M. Rutten, A. Mazrui and F. Grignon (eds.), Out of the
Count:  the 1997 General  Elections  and Prospects  of  Democracy in Kenya,  Kampala,  Fountain
Publishers,  2001,  p. 50–71;  H.  Maupeu,  ‘Religion and the elections.’  In H.  Maupeu,  M.
Katumanga, W. Mitullah (eds.), The Moi Succession… .op. cit., p. 33–68.
47. Maisha Bora, meaning a good life, was the slogan taken up by ODM.
48. In the large towns of the country, violence was also manifest through looting of shops
and supermarkets.
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